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SHOOT FIRST ESTABLISH LIABILITY LATER: THE DUTY OF CARE 






The vulnerability of mentally ill persons to serious or fatal harm in 
confrontations with police is compounded by over-stretched mental health 
services in Australia and an inadequately trained police force. Despite 
criticism by some commentators, lawyers and human rights groups, to the 
use of guns and other potentially lethal devices by police to restrain mentally 
ill persons, there is little tangible evidence that the landscape for the 
mentally ill is improving. The ability of tort law to provide any justice for 
mentally ill people and their families harmed by the system is complicated 
by the uncertain boundaries of the scope of the duty of care owed by the 
police. This paper considers recent cases in which the police have been sued 
in negligence in circumstances where a confrontation has ended in a 
mentally ill person being shot by police. In particular it looks at the policy 
arguments that have been raised for and against imposing a duty of care on 
police, the factors that impact on duty determination and how and in what 





Police encounters with people suffering from mental illness are often complex, 
unpredictable and may be dangerous. While the vast majority of the estimated 
148,000 annual interactions in Australia between police and people with a mental 
illness end constructively,
1
 there continue to be a number of incidents that result 
in serious or fatal consequences for the person with mental illness. In fact, 
according to the Australian Institute of Criminology, of all persons fatally shot by 
police between 1 January 1990 and 30 June 2011, 40% were people with a mental 
illness.
2
 In recognition that traditional police tactics have been unsuccessful in 
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dealing with people with mental illness, a number of jurisdictions have adopted 




Failure by police to provide an integrated and appropriate response to a man, who 
whilst suffering from a psychotic episode was shot by police, has been the subject 
of a recent negligence action in the Australian Capital Territory.
4
 Like so many 
police negligence cases before, the ACT police attempted to defend their actions in 
Crowley v The Commonwealth
5
 by denying that they owed the plaintiff a duty of 
care. The ‘no duty’ argument was based chiefly on the ubiquitous policy arguments 
first raised in the seminal case of Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire.
6
 
Originally devised in Hill to shield police from a claim that they had failed to 
protect a member of the general public from being harmed by an unknown third 
party criminal, the policy arguments adopt the familiar line that imposition of a 
duty will result in defensive practices being adopted by police and constitute a drain 
on police resources.
7
 Despite limited scrutiny of their validity, the policy arguments 
both in Australia and the United Kingdom have continued to be applied to an 
increasing array of police conduct, so much so that they have been criticised by 
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It is arguable that the ACT Supreme Court in Crowley has gone some way towards 
stemming the pervasive reach of the Hill policy considerations by providing 
welcome guidance as to the appropriate boundaries of the duty of care owed by 
police, principally as it relates to positive acts of the police as opposed to police 
investigatory omissions. In finding that the Hill public policy considerations had 
been previously misunderstood and as a consequence too widely applied in a 
previous police shooting case, the court in Crowley held that the police owed a duty 
of care to the mentally ill plaintiff and were negligent in their response to his 
psychotic episode. 
 
Focusing on the three Australian negligence cases that have dealt with the police 
shooting of a mentally ill person, this paper analysis how the courts have dealt with 
the pivotal question of the existence and scope of the duty of care owed by police. 
Although involving similar fact situations, each of the three cases represents a 
different approach to the Hill policy considerations, with varying results. As such 
the law in this area remains unsettled. Furthermore while the law discussed may be 
said to apply to police activity more generally, the focus is directed to these 
confrontations as they represent vastly different factual situations to that envisaged 





The paper begins with a broad overview of the Hill considerations and their 
application in Australia before turning to a discussion of the police shooting cases. 
The paper concludes that the recent Crowley judgment adopts an approach that sits 
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Police and community need better mental health training’ 25/11/2011 at http://theconversation.edu.au/tyler-




most comfortably with the current methodology of the High Court to novel duty 
situations and offers appropriate limits to the Hill policy considerations. 
Importantly the case also provides a measure of accountability to ensure police act 
reasonably and appropriately in dealing with some of the most vulnerable and 
marginalised members of the community, the mentally ill.   
 
 
II THE DUTY OF CARE CONUNDRUM AND THE CONTINUING LEGACY OF HILL V CHIEF 
CONSTABLE OF WEST YORKSHIRE 
 
 
Over the past two decades in Australia, there have been a number of civil suits 
instigated by disgruntled members of the public for various alleged police flaws, 
the majority of which have failed at the first hurdle of the negligence claim, duty of 
care.
10
 The arguments militating against a duty finding have been based in large 
part on the policy arguments first enunciated in Hill. 
 
In Hill, the mother of the last victim of a serial murderer brought an action against 
the police alleging negligence in their failure to apprehend the accused prior to the 
death of her daughter.
11
 The court denied the police owed a duty of care to the 
victim, due to the lack of proximity. As the daughter was one of a large number of 
potential victims she was not at a distinctive risk, no ‘special relationship arose’ and 
thus no duty to protect her existed.
12
 Although lack of proximity was sufficient to 
dispose of the action in Hill, Lord Keith created further barriers for plaintiffs,
13
 by 
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For an overview of the Australian cases dealing with police negligence cases see Paul Marshall, ‘Police 
liability in negligence : The Application of the Hill Immunity in Australia’ (2007) 15 Tort Law Journal 34; 
See also Shircore above n 8. 
11 For a detailed critique of the investigation in Hill, including the reasons why the plaintiff brought the claim, see 
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enunciating a number of public policy grounds supporting a ‘no-duty’ finding.
14
 
Similar to policy arguments once used to support advocates immunity, Lord Keith 
held police should not be liable for actions arising from the investigation and 
suppression of crime, on the basis that it ‘may lead to the exercise of a function 
being carried on in a defensive frame of mind.’
15
 Along with this defensive practice 
argument, Lord Keith also held that police policy and discretion, both integral to 
police officers’ duties of investigation, should not be questioned by the court. 
Police resources, he said, should not be diverted from police operational functions 




There has been much criticism of both the rationale for the Hill policy 
considerations and their application to allegations of police failings, particularly in 
fact situations that differ vastly from Hill. 
17
Despite warnings from the European 
Human Rights Court that the Hill policy considerations should not be used as a 
blanket immunity for police in the United Kingdom,
18
 the House of Lords has 
continued to provide strong support for the defensive practice argument, in contexts 
that differ factually from Hill.
19
Although the High Court of Australia has not had 
the opportunity to consider the application of Hill directly, support has been shown 
for the policy considerations.  
 
In Sullivan v Moody the High Court noted: 
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16Hill [1989] AC 53, 59. 
17
See for example Shircore and McIvor above n 8. 
18
Osman v. United Kingdom - 23452/94 [1998] ECHR 101. 
19
See Brooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] 1 WLR 1495; Chief Constable of 




In Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, the House of Lords held that 
police officers did not owe a duty to individual members of the public 
who might suffer injury through their careless failure to apprehend a 
dangerous criminal. Lord Keith of Kinkell pointed out that the conduct of 
police investigation involves a variety of decisions as to priorities in the 
deployment of resources. To subject those decisions to a common law 






In respect to a person under investigation by the police, Gummow and Kirby JJ 
stated in Tame v New South Wales: 
 
It is unlikely that an investigating police officer owes a duty of care to a 
person whose conduct is under investigation. Such a duty would appear 
to be inconsistent with the police officer’s duty ultimately based in the 
statutory framework and anterior common law by which the relevant 






Consistent with these statements, state courts have applied the Hill grounds to an 
expanding array of police negligence cases, often without a clear pronouncement of 
the ambit of the exclusionary grounds. So wide has been the application of the Hill 
considerations that they have been referred to by some courts and commentators as 




The circumstances in which a duty of care has been denied at a state level in 
Australia include: 
 
                                                             
20(2002) CLR 251, [57]. 
21Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR540, [231]. 
22 See eg, Cran v New South Wales (2004) 62 NSWLR 95, where Santow JA refers continually to the police 
immunity from owing a duty of care in relation to investigations, except possibly where the police have 
expressly assumed responsibility to an individual. More recent Australian cases have stated however there is 
no police immunity in Australia. See, eg Peat v Lin [2005] 1 Qd R 40; New South Wales v Tryst [2008] 




 Allegations of police negligence in failing to investigate or prosecute a 
crime in which the plaintiff was the complainant.
23
 
 Where the plaintiff is a person under investigation,24 including where the 
plaintiff claimed the police were negligent in failing to arrange prompt drug 
analysis with the result that the accused’s detention in custody was 
prolonged. To subject administrative police tasks to a duty of care was held 
to have dire resource implications warranting ‘immunity’ to the police. 
25
 
 Where the plaintiff was a victim of criminal conduct. In such cases the 
‘general rule ….that one man is under no duty of controlling another man to 
prevent his doing damage to a third’
26
 has operated to defeat claims brought 
by victims of criminal conduct.
27
 Although it must be noted, that there have 
been two instances in which the state courts have held, in refusing to strike 
out the plaintiff’s statement of claim, that it was arguable that the police had 
assumed responsibility to an identified individual who had relied on police 
protection, thereby giving rise to a possible duty of care.
28
 
 Allegations of negligence in the use of information which then exposed the 
plaintiff to the death penalty.
29
 This was based on the purpose and function 
of the police to investigate the matter and the conflicting obligations that 
imposition of a duty would place upon the officers.
30
 
 Where the plaintiffs have alleged negligence in the police handling of a 
matter involving a family member, with the result that the plaintiff has 
                                                             
23 See Gibbs v Commissioner of Police (Qld) [2000] QCA 33 (unreported, 21 February 2000). 
24 See, eg, Wilson v New South Wales (2001) 53 NSWLR 407, Courtney v Tasmania [2000] TASSC 83.  
25 See Cran v New South Wales (2004) 62 NSWLR 95. 
26Smith v Leurs(1945) 70 CLR 256, 262 (Dixon J). See also Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v 
Anzil(2000) 205 CLR 254.  
27 See, eg, Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 All ER 344, Van Colle v Hertfordshire Police [2008] 3 All ER 977 
(QB), Taha v Shaq Industries Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 30, Victoria v Richards (2010) 27 VR 343.  
28 See, eg, Batchelor v Tasmania (2005) 13 Tas R 403, NSW v Spearpoint [2009] NSWCA 233. 
29Rush v Commissioner of Police (2006) 150 FCR 165. 




suffered psychiatric harm.  These included claims by the plaintiffs of police 
negligence in identifying their deceased mothers after a traffic accident. The 
result of the negligence being that each of the deceased was identified as the 
other, with one incorrectly buried and the other incorrectly cremated.
31
 
Another involved a claim made by a family that the police had been 
negligent in the handling of a missing person investigation, resulting in a 
five year delay in identifying a body as a missing person.
32
 
 Where off-duty police officers attending a nightclub, witnessed a patron of 
the club being abusive and violent and failed to act to restrain him prior to 
his viscous assault on the plaintiff.
33
 
 Where police officers alerted an absconding parent that they were aware of 





Despite these cases, there is some evidence that Australian courts have become 
more circumspect in their approach to the Hill principle. In two separate instances 
involving actions initiated by victims of domestic violence, state courts refused to 
strike out the plaintiff’s claim as it was held to be arguable that the police had 
assumed responsibility to provide some protection for the particular victims, 
thereby negating or limiting the effect of the Hill policy considerations.
35
 More 
recently in NSW v Tryst, Campbell JA refused to accept that the Hill policy 
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The Crowley case similarly signals that Australian courts are carefully considering 
what is and should be the ambit of the Hill policy considerations.  Despite an 
earlier New South Wales Court of Appeal case that had held the Hill policy 
considerations applicable to a police shooting case, the ACT Supreme Court in 
Crowley was prepared to limit the effect of the Hill principles within an analysis 
that considered all the salient features of the case. The Crowley case and the two 
shooting cases that preceded it are considered in detail in the following section. 
 
III POLICE SHOOTING CASES 
 
At the outset it should be noted that the police shooting cases involve vastly 
different factual situations to that of Hill. In two of the cases the injury was caused 
to the plaintiff directly through the police shooting, while in the other case the 
plaintiffs were family members of the man shot by the police. It is somewhat 
surprising that the Hill policy considerations were considered relevant to the 
shooting cases.. Hill was concerned with the discretionary decision making of 
police involved in a police investigation. Furthermore, in Hill both the criminal 
third party and the victim were unknown to the police. The alleged police 
negligence involved an omission to act (failure to apprehend the criminal third 
party), and it was this omission that caused the plaintiff’s harm. In the shooting 
cases, on the other hand, the police negligence involved apprehending a mentally 
disturbed person and during the operation, discharging a firearm directly 





In the first of the cases Zalewski v Turcarolo,
37
 the Victorian Supreme Court 
(Appeal Division) found police liable in negligence and battery after they had shot 
and injured the 22 year-old plaintiff, who had a history of mental illness. On the 
day of the shooting, the plaintiff had become depressed, was suffering from 
psychotic delusions and had taken his father’s shotgun into his bedroom and shut 
the door (the implication being that the plaintiff was contemplating self-harm). 
The plaintiff’s father had entered the room to ask the plaintiff what he was doing, 
but after being asked to be left alone, the father called the police requesting 
assistance. Upon arrival at the house, there was no attempt by police to determine 
whether the gun was loaded or to negotiate with the plaintiff from outside his 
room. Instead within minutes, the police had entered the bedroom with their guns 
drawn and shot the plaintiff, seriously injuring him. The plaintiff claimed that the 
police failed to correctly assess the situation and to act in accordance with training 
and instructions. 
 
The Victorian police argued that even if they were negligent in their conduct 
towards the plaintiff, they were immune from liability based on public policy 
considerations, namely because ‘the absence of such an immunity would lead to 
investigative operations being carried on in a detrimentally defensive frame of 
mind’.
38
 Hansen J noted that any immunity granted to the police did not apply to all 
police activities, as had been conceded by Lord Keith in Hill.
39
 Police officers, it 
was said, may be liable for ‘on the spot’ operational activities, including for 
example negligent driving, referred to in the UK case of Knightley v Johns
40
 as 
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incidents of ‘specifically identified antecedent negligent conduct’.
41
 Finding that 
the Zalewski case differed from Hill, which had involved failure of police to 
apprehend an unknown criminal, Hansen J held that the basis for the immunity did 
not exist ‘because Zalewski did not act in accordance with his training and 






More than ten years later in NSW v Klein,
43
 the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
expressed doubt about the correctness of the Zalewski decision. In the Klein case, 
the relatives of a man shot and killed by police claimed psychiatric harm caused 
by the alleged police negligence in dealing with the mentally ill man. The man 
had been at his grandmother’s house when in a disturbed psychotic state he 
surrounded himself with knives. When approached by his mother he became 
aggressive. After she called the police, the man set a fire in the house.  The fire 
brigade was called, however they were unable to enter the house to extinguish the 
fire while the disturbed man remained inside. The statement of claim did not 
specify what occurred next, other than to state that the disturbed man was later 
shot by police outside the house.
44
 On appeal the court struck out the plaintiffs’ 
claim on the basis that the police did not owe them a duty of care. 
 
Although Klein concerned claims of psychiatric harm caused to the plaintiffs as a 
result of being in the vicinity of the police shooting, the court considered how 
courts in Australia had dealt with the Hill policy grounds since the Victorian case 
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 While not going so far as to declare that Zalewski had been wrongly 
decided, Young CJ was persuaded that the Hill policy grounds had received 
widespread acceptance in Australia since Zalewski, noting in particular the 
comments by the High Court in Sullivan v Moody,
46
 Tame v Annetts
47
 and 
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid.
48
 In doing so Young CJ doubted the 
precedent value of Zalewski.
49
 His Honour noted that the few cases in the United 
Kingdom and Australia where a duty had been held to exist involved ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ or situations where the police had assumed responsibility to a 
particular individual, for example by taking control of the situation.
50
 As the 
police had not assumed responsibility for the plaintiffs in Klein, the court was 
prepared to strike out the plaintiffs’ claim, because as Young CJ stated ‘the core 
principle in Hill's case is so strong that the hopelessness of the plaintiffs' case is 
plain no matter what the facts.’
51
 As noted by Penfold J in the Crowley case 





In May 2011, in Crowley v The Commonwealth,
53
 after a detailed examination of 
the facts and history of police negligence cases in Australia and the United 
Kingdom, Penfold J in the Supreme Court of the ACT held police liable in 
negligence for the shooting injury to the plaintiff, Jonathan Crowley. On the day 
of the shooting, after contact with mental health workers, the plaintiff had left his 
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48(2005) 223 CLR 1. 
49Klein [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-862, [25] 
50Klein [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-862, [25]. 
51Klein [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-862, [23]. 
52Crowley (2011) 251 FLR 1, 98. 




parents’ house carrying a kendo stick.
54
 After some unusual and threatening 
interactions with members of the public, the police were called to locate the 
plaintiff.  Upon discovering the plaintiff in a suburban street, two police officers 
pulled up in their car close to the plaintiff and after alighting from the vehicle 
yelled at the plaintiff to put down his weapon and get on the ground. The plaintiff 
failed to comply and instead advanced towards the police who attempted to 
disarm him by spraying him with capsicum spray. When this did not work and the 
plaintiff attacked the officers with the kendo stick, one of the officers shot the 
plaintiff. Similar to the Zalewski case, the police negligence was found to consist 
of inadequate preparation and failure to follow appropriate training and procedure 
in dealing with the mentally disturbed plaintiff in the circumstances. 
 
Penfold J in Crowley’s case noted that developments in Australia since the 1995 
case of Zalewski raised the question of whether Zalewski, so similar on the facts to 
the case of Crowley, was still good law. 
55
 In an exhaustive analysis of the police 
negligence cases, Penfold J held that the Hill public policy grounds as accepted in 
Australia, were intended to apply to police investigative work, that is, work that 
involves the investigation of crime leading to the apprehension of criminals.
56
 
Thus a case involving positive police conduct, or operational police work, causing 
damage to specified individuals, as occurred in Crowley and Zalewski could fall 
outside the Hill principle.
57
 Penfold J considered that the court in Klein had 
defined police investigative work too widely, in effect applying the no duty 
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Penfold J considered investigatory work, as intended by the Hill line of cases, 
applies to police work that raises issues such as: the allocation of resources; 
choices made by police officers in the lines of inquiry; the care and efficiency 
with which lines of inquiry are pursued; the records made in the course of inquiry 
and the management of information generated during an investigation, including 




Factors which would warrant a no duty finding would therefore include: 
  
[T]he difficulty of identifying a class of persons to whom the duty would 
be owed, … the risk of subjecting police to irreconcilably conflicting 
duties, and … the public policy impacts such as the constraining effect of 




In finding that the Hill policy grounds did not apply to the Crowley case her 
Honour stated: 
 
I propose to determine this action on the basis that liability for physical 
injuries caused as a result of police negligence, even if that negligence 
occurs in the course of police action that is directly related to a current 
investigation, is to be determined by reference to whether in the 
circumstances of the particular case the police officers involved have 
assumed a duty of care, rather than by reference to a general absence of 





She stated further: 
 
There are no doubt various ways in which police may assume a duty of care 
in a particular situation; for present purposes it is sufficient to say that where 
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police have taken control, or are attempting to take control, of a situation in 
reliance on their authority and powers as police officers, it is reasonable to 
find that they have assumed a duty of care to anyone who is directly caught 





A Preserving the Coherence in the Common Law 
 
 
Following the current approach of the High Court to novel duty determinations,
63
 
Penfold J also considered whether a finding that the police owed a duty of care to 
the plaintiff, would be inconsistent with other police duties and thereby disturb the 
coherence in the common law.
64
 The defendants had argued that any specific duty 
owed to the plaintiff (an individual offender or suspect) would conflict with their 
general police duties to prevent crime and protect the public. However Penfold J 
refused to accept that owing a duty of care to individuals caught up in operational 
situations (including suspects and offenders), would conflict with more general 
duties, noting in particular that a common law duty would in fact be consistent 
with Australian Federal Police policy documents which include the principle that 




Her Honour noted that a duty of care could be owed to more than one person in a 
given situation and that exercising judgment in complex situations, with a number 
of peoples’ welfare to consider, did not necessarily involve conflicting 
considerations and duties. This case could be distinguished from Sullivan v 
Moody
66
 where the interests of the children were paramount and any duty owed to 
the fathers would necessarily conflict with the duty owed to the children.  
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Accordingly Penfold J found that once ‘the police officers got out of their car and 
started giving orders to Jonathan, they were clearly exercising their authority as 
police officers and taking control of the situation…..[in doing so they]…assumed 





Any suggestion that the finding of a duty of care would detract from the primary 
role of publicly funded entities by diverting attention to the trouble and expense of 
litigation would be to ‘reject the currently wide-spread expectation that publicly-
funded bodies should be accountable both for the expenditure of public funds and 
more broadly for the exercise of the powers and discretions conferred on them for 
the purpose of their functions, an expectation that is reflected in Australia in the 
proliferation of methods of scrutinising the expenditure of public moneys and 




After an exhaustive consideration of the evidence, which included examination of 
the police training procedures and police policy manuals, Penfold J held that the 
two police officers involved in the confrontation with Jonathon had breached their 
duty of care to him by failing to plan and assess the situation adequately (which 
included a failure to follow police procedural principles) and confronting 
Jonathon in the manner in which they did, although no breach was found in 
relation to the use of weapons by the officers involved. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
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In finding that the police owed a duty of care to the plaintiff in Crowley, the ACT 
Supreme Court has rejected the reasoning of the NSW Court of Appeal in Klein. 
In doing so, Penfold J has attempted to articulate the boundaries of the Hill public 
policy grounds and reconcile the many cases that have considered the application 
of the grounds as they have been applied to an increasing array of police conduct. 
By following the current approach of the High Court to novel duty of care 
questions, Penfold J has rejected any notion that police enjoy immunity from 
negligence actions and from which exceptions must be argued. Instead her 
Honour has analysed the existence and scope of a duty of care in terms of the 
legislative framework of the police services, coherence of the law, issues of 
control and the effect of public policy grounds. 
 
By limiting the ambit of the Hill grounds to carefully defined investigative duties, 
her Honour has determined that a duty of care may arise where police exercise 
their authority, take control of a situation and in doing so cause harm to persons 
directly caught up in the exercise of such authority. Such an analysis accords with 
the few recent state cases in which there has been a refusal to strike out the 
plaintiff’s claim on the basis that the police had taken control of a situation and 
assumed responsibility to the plaintiff.
69
 While both the House of Lords in the 
United Kingdom and the Canadian Supreme Court have been afforded the 
opportunity to reassess the continued effect of the Hill policy grounds as they 
apply to more contemporary police conduct,
70
 the Australian High Court has yet 
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Constable of the Hertfordshire Police[2008] 3 WLR 593, Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police. 




to directly consider the issue. With the Crowley case currently under appeal, it 




Should the determination in Crowley be upheld, police will be required to ensure 
that they assess and execute confrontations with people suffering mental illness in 
accordance with appropriate procedures and training. Although outside of the 
scope of this paper, this may involve establishing systems that involve greater 
integration with mental health service providers and a more co-ordinated response 




The task faced by police in apprehending and dealing with people suffering from 
mental illness and psychotic episodes is an unenviable one. Compounding the 
problem is that the mental health system is overstretched and training procedures 
for police have tended to be inadequate. But as Crowley demonstrates, the 
common law can provide a measure of accountability to ensure that police operate 
in a reasonable manner to minimise the possibility of continued adverse outcomes.  
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pass on information concerning Jonathon Crowley to the police, which may have assisted in his apprehension.  
